



Fraud, Abuse, and Opioids 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Legislation, regulation, scholarship, and journalism addressing the 
opioid crisis has focused on a number of front-end management strategies, 
including opioid production quotas,1 opioid taxes,2 drug labeling,3 risk 
evaluation and mitigation strategies,4 marketing restrictions,5 opioid 
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 1.  See Scott Burris et al., Stopping an Invisible Epidemic: Legal Issues in the Provision of 
Naloxone to Prevent Opioid Overdose, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 273, 286 (2009) (discussing production 
quotas as well as eradication programs, border controls, and street-level disruptions as supply-side 
interventions that can help interfere with the production and distribution of opioids and other drugs).  
 2.   See, e.g., Editorial, Kill Cuomo’s Cockamamie ‘Opioid Tax’, N.Y. POST (Mar. 22, 2018), 
https://nypost.com/2018/03/22/kill-cuomos-cockamamie-opioid-tax/ [https://perma.cc/U2HH-L58C] 
(criticizing Governor Andrew Cuomo’s proposed two-cents-per-milligram opioid tax, also known as 
an “opioid epidemic surcharge” and questioning whether pharmaceutical companies would actually 
pay the tax).  
 3.   Patricia J. Zettler, Margaret Foster Riley & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Implementing a Public 
Health Perspective in FDA Drug Regulation, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 221, 247–55 (2018) (discussing 
the FDA’s influence of provider and patient behavior through drug labeling). 
 4.   Hilary Homenko, Rehabilitating Opioid Regulation: A Prescription for the FDA’s Next 
Proposal of an Opioid Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS), 22 HEALTH MATRIX 273, 
290–312 (2012) (discussing the FDA’s authority to require a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy 
(REMS) as part of a drug approval application; applying REMS to the opioid crisis). 
 5.   See, e.g., Ameet Sarpatwari, Michael S. Sinha & Aaron S. Kesselheim, The Opioid 
Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 472–73 (2017) 
(arguing that ineffective penalties for illegal marketing incentivized opioid manufacturers to make 
misleading claims). 
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insurance coverage limitations,6 physician prescribing practices,7 
prescription drug monitoring programs,8 prescription safety alert systems,9 
maximum initial opioid prescription quantities,10 continuing opioid 
education for opioid prescribers,11 and temporary restraining orders for 
improper opioid prescribers.12  Back-end crisis-management strategies, 
                                                          
 6.   See, e.g., Stacey A. Tovino, State Benchmark Plan Coverage of Opioid Use Disorder 
Treatments and Services: Trends and Limitations, 70 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (surveying state 
benchmark plan coverage of opioid use disorder treatments and services and identifying trends and 
limitations relevant thereto); Lev Facher, Tapered to Zero: In Radical Move, Oregon’s Medicaid 
Program Weighs Cutting Off Chronic Pain Patients from Opioids, STAT (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.statnews.com/2018/08/15/oregon-medicaid-tapering-opioids/ [https://perma.cc/MQL2-
QN6N] (reporting Oregon officials’ consideration of a proposal that would end Medicaid coverage of 
opioids for Medicaid beneficiaries with chronic pain); Brett Kelman, Blue Cross Will Stop Covering 
OxyContin in Tennessee Next Year, TENNESSEAN (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.tennessean.com/ 
story/news/health/2018/09/06/blue-cross-stop-covering-oxycontin-tennessee-opioid-epidemic/11099 
15002/ [https://perma.cc/B2QX-XARG] (“The largest health insurance company in Tennessee will 
stop covering OxyContin prescriptions next year as part of sweeping policy changes intended to 
combat opioid addiction and make pain pills less valuable on the black market.”). 
 7.   See generally Kelly K. Dineen, Definitions Matter: Defining Inappropriate Prescribing to 
Shape Effective Opioid Policy and Reduce Patient Harm, 67 U. KAN. L. REV. __ (2019) (assessing 
opioid prescribing policy and the lack of definitions for inappropriate prescribing; offering a new 
framework for inappropriate prescribing); Kelly K. Dineen & James M. Dubois, Between a Rock and 
a Hard Place: Can Physicians Prescribe Opioids to Treat Pain Adequately While Avoiding Legal 
Sanction?, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2016) (reviewing cases of inappropriate prescribing and suggesting 
a new framework for describing and categorizing inappropriate prescribers); Kelly K. Dineen, 
Addressing Prescription Opioid Abuse Concerns in Context: Synchronizing Policy Solutions to 
Multiple Complex Public Health Problems, 40 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (2016) (examining prescription 
opioid policy in light of available morbidity and mortality data and suggesting areas of policy priority 
that better align with evidence). 
 8.   See, e.g., Jennifer Oliva, Prescription Drug Policing: The Right to Protected Health 
Information Privacy Pre- and Post-Carpenter, 69 DUKE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (arguing that 
courts are more likely to rule that warrantless Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) searches of sensitive 
health care data stored in prescription drug monitoring program (PDMP) databases violate the Fourth 
Amendment post-Carpenter v. United States). 
 9.   See, e.g., Jessica Davis, Nationwide Prescription Safety Alert System Proposed by House 
Bill, HEATHCARE IT NEWS, (Aug. 31, 2018, 2:57 PM), https://www.healthcareitnews.com/ 
news/nationwide-prescription-safety-alert-system-proposed-house-bill [https://perma.cc/5UHR-
HW6M] (discussing House Representatives Tom MacArthur, Barbara Comstock, and Ann Kuster’s 
introduction of new legislation to create a nationwide Prescription Safety Alert System to help prevent 
patient opioid abuse). 
 10.   An Act Relating to Regulation of Opioid Drugs, OKLA. STAT. tit. 63 § 2-309I (Westlaw 
though 2018 Legis. Sess.) (prohibiting practitioners from issuing an initial prescription for an opioid 
drug in a quantity exceeding a seven-day supply for treatment of acute pain in an adult patient or a 
patient under the age of eighteen; further requiring any opioid prescription for acute pain to be for the 
lowest effective dose of the immediate-release version of the opioid drug). 
 11.   OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, § 161.10a (Westlaw though 2018 Legis. Sess.) (requiring Oklahoma 
licensed physicians who have DEA numbers to take at least one hour of continuing education in the 
area of pain management or opioid addiction prior to license renewal). 
 12.   See Alex Ebert, DOJ Restraining Orders Strip Docs’ Opioid Prescribing Rights, 
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (last updated Aug. 22, 2018, 3:17 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/ 
document/X3SFRFPC000000?bna_news_filter=health-law-and-business&jcsearch=BNA%2520000 
0016562c8d309a5757aeef3520002#jcite [http://perma.cc/U3DG-WPFW] (reporting that the U.S. 
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including needle exchange programs,13 safe injection sites,14 naloxone 
availability,15 medication-assisted treatment,16 mobile health care 
services,17 national recovery housing best practices,18 integrated treatment 
for individuals with co-occurring mental disorders,19 information sharing 
with families and caregivers during opioid overdoses,20 insurance 
coverage of opioid addiction and overdose treatments,21 opioid treatment 
insurance parity,22 and even sharply-written letters by medical examiners 
                                                          
Department of Justice (DOJ) is using civil temporary restraining orders to prevent physicians from 
writing improper opioid prescriptions while under investigation for illegal conduct; also reporting that 
the DOJ used the emergency orders against two Ohio physicians who were allegedly caught giving 
opioids to undercover patients who did not need the opioids). 
 13.   See Melissa Vallejo, Safer Bathrooms in Syringe Exchange Programs: Injecting Progress 
into the Harm Reduction Movement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1185, 1211–24 (2018) (advocating for safe 
bathrooms as part of syringe exchange programs).  
 14.   See, e.g., Alex H. Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic: 
Lessons from an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 919, 
919–21 (2017) (defining safe injection sites as “legally sanctioned locations that provide a hygienic 
space for people to inject pre-obtained drugs while observed by trained staff”; noting that such sites 
have the dual aims of increasing the safety of individuals who inject drugs and reducing the public 
nuisance associated with public injection). 
 15.   Corey S. Davis & Derek H. Carr, The Law and Policy of Opioids for Pain Management, 
Addiction Treatment, and Overdose Reversal, 14 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 1, 26–37 (2017) (examining 
naloxone access).  
 16.   See, e.g., Page M. Smith, Implementing Medicaid Health Homes to Provide Medication 
Assisted Treatment to Opioid Dependent Medicaid Beneficiaries, 106 KY. L.J. 111, 123–43 (2017-
2018) (assessing the application of the Medicaid health home model in terms of delivering medication 
assisted treatment to Medicaid recipients). 
 17.   See, e.g., Jacob Dawson, Public Gives Input on Federal Grant to Combat Opioids in N.H., 
CONCORD MONITOR (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.concordmonitor.com/Public-gives-input-to-
DHHS-about-opioid-grant-funds-19451667 [https://perma.cc/V32X-ACWH?type=image] (reporting 
public input regarding the opioid crisis; noting public desire for better mobile services). 
 18.   SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act, Pub. L. No. 115-271, § 7031, 132 Stat. 3894 
(2018) (requiring the Secretary of the federal Department of Health and Human Services (Secretary), 
in consultation with other individuals and entities, to identify or facilitate the development of best 
practices, which may include model laws for implementing suggested minimum standards for recovery 
housing). 
 19.   See, e.g., Allison Petersen et al., State Legislative Responses to the Opioid Crisis: Leading 
Examples, 11 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 30, 66 (2018) (discussing targeted case management, including 
insurance coverage thereof, for patients with co-occurring mental health and substance use disorders, 
including opioid use disorder). 
 20.   SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act § 7052 (requiring the Secretary to annually 
notify health care providers regarding permitted disclosures under federal health privacy laws during 
emergencies, including opioid overdoses, of certain health information to families, caregivers, and 
health care providers). 
 21.   See, e.g., Sara Hansard, Health Insurer Uses Prevention, Therapy to Fight Opioid Crisis, 
BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018, 1:17 PM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/ 
XDE7AN4K000000?bna_news_filter=health-law-and-business&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001651f4 
8d5faaf759f5cacde0002#jcite [https://perma.cc/5JFV-5FMV] (noting that Philadelphia-based 
Independence Blue Cross ended prior authorization requirements for insurance coverage of opioid use 
disorder treatments and made lifesaving drugs available for insureds who had overdosed on opioids). 
 22.   SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act § 5021 (requiring mental health and substance 
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to prescribing physicians following a patient’s death due to overdose23 
have also received significant attention.  Less attention has been paid, 
however, to the role of health care fraud and abuse authorities in 
combating the opioid crisis.  This Article helps to fill this gap in the 
literature by analyzing recent government enforcement actions involving 
two health care fraud and abuse authorities, including the federal Anti-
Kickback Statute and the federal civil False Claims Act, in cases involving 
opioids.24 
Part II of this Article examines recent government enforcement 
actions involving the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, which prohibits 
(among other conduct) the exchange of remuneration for opioid 
prescriptions, patient referrals for drug testing services, and patient 
referrals for addiction treatment services if such prescriptions or services 
are reimbursed in whole or in part by a federal health care program.25  Part 
III of this Article examines recent government enforcement actions 
involving the federal civil False Claims Act, which prohibits (among other 
conduct) factually and legally false opioid prescription claims, drug testing 
                                                          
use disorder coverage under the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) to be provided at parity 
with physical health coverage).  
 23.   See, e.g., Margot Sanger-Katz, Here’s a Cheap Way to Fight Drug Misuse: Send Doctors a 
Sharp Letter, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/05/upshot/letters-to-
doctors-opioid-research.html [https://perma.cc/T97N-ZVTU] (“Two studies find that nudges 
[sharply-written letters to prescribing physicians following a patient’s death from opioids] can lead to 
more scrupulous prescribing.”). 
 24.   Beyond the scope of this limited symposium Article are cases involving violations of federal 
and state laws other than the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the federal civil False Claims Act.  
See, e.g., Leslie A. Pappas, Pharmacy’s Sloppy Record Keeping Results in $100K Fine, BLOOMBERG 
L. NEWS (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XAQPGJ04000000? 
bna_news_filter=health-law-and-business&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001651ff7dfa0a5ed7ff7f8fc000 
0#jcite [https://perma.cc/H9WL-ME92] (reporting that AccuServ Pharmacy and its owner, pharmacist 
Marvin P. Sheffler, agreed to pay $100,000 in civil penalties to resolve allegations that it failed to 
properly keep track of prescription opioids and other addictive drugs in accordance with the Controlled 
Substances Act, which establishes strict record-keeping requirements applicable to addictive 
prescription medications); Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018, in the SUPPORT for 
Patients and Communities Act § 8121 (making illegal the knowing and willful solicitation or receipt, 
or offer or payment, of remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind, in 
return for the referral of a patient or patronage to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or 
laboratory or to induce a referral of an individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or 
laboratory for which payment may be made under any public or private health care benefit program; 
establishing criminal penalties of not more than $200,000, imprisonment of not more than ten years, 
or both, for each such occurrence); 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) (2012) (making illegal the knowing and willful 
execution of, or attempt to execute, a scheme or artifice designed to: (1) “defraud any [public or 
private] health care benefit program;” or (2) obtain, by “false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, 
or promises, any of the money owned by or under the custody or control of any public or private health 
care benefit program”; establishing criminal penalties for violations thereof, including fines and 
imprisonment). 
 25.   Infra Part II. 
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claims, and addiction treatment claims when such claims are submitted for 
payment to a federal health care program.26  Finally, Part IV addresses the 
role of the Anti-Kickback Statute and the False Claims Act in combating 
the opioid crisis and highlights new government initiatives in this area, 
including: (1) the Prescription Interdiction & Litigation Task Force, 
created by the Department of Justice in February 2018; (2) the Eliminating 
Kickbacks in Recovery Act, signed into law by President Trump in 
October 2018; and (3) a mega anti-fraud program known as the Unified 
Program Integrity Contractor, announced by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services in November 2018.27 
II. THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE 
A. Background 
The federal Anti-Kickback Statute, also known as the Illegal 
Remuneration Statute, prohibits the knowing and willful solicitation, 
receipt, offer, or payment of any remuneration (including any kickback, 
bribe, or rebate), directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in 
kind, in return for the referral of any individual for the furnishing of any 
item or service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under 
a federal health care program,28 such as Medicare,29 Medicaid,30 and 
Tricare.31  The Anti-Kickback Statute also prohibits remuneration 
knowingly and willfully exchanged in return for “purchasing, leasing, 
                                                          
 26.   Infra Part III. 
 27.   Infra Part IV. 
 28.   42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A) (2012) (limiting the application of the Anti-
Kickback Statute to federal health care program business). 
 29.   Medicare is federally administered insurance program that Americans pay into throughout 
their working lives and enroll in after they retire or acquire a disability. Medicare provides “basic 
protection against the costs of hospital, related post-hospital, home health services, and hospice care” 
for individuals who are age sixty-five or over; individuals under age 65 who have been entitled for not 
less than twenty-four months to Social Security Disability Insurance benefits; and certain individuals 
who have end stage renal disease.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395–1395lll (2012 & Supp. 2017) (governing 
Medicare). 
 30.   Medicaid is a joint federal and state program that, together with the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, provides health insurance coverage to over 72.5 million Americans, including low 
income families, qualified pregnant women and children, and individuals receiving Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI).  States may choose to cover other individuals, such as individuals receiving 
home and community-based services and children in foster care who are not otherwise eligible for 
Medicaid.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396–1396w-5 (2012 & Supp. 2017) (governing Medicaid). 
 31.   Tricare (formerly known as CHAMPUS) is a health insurance program carried out by the 
U.S. Department of Defense that furnishes medical and dental care to members and veterans of the 
armed forces as well as their family members.  See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1071–1110 (2012 & Supp. 2017) 
(governing Tricare). 
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ordering or recommending purchasing, leasing, or ordering any good, 
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in whole or in 
part under a federal health care program.”32 
The Anti-Kickback Statute is premised on the concern that health care 
kickbacks can lead to corruption of medical decision making; patient 
steering; overutilization of health care items, services, and supplies; 
increased costs to federal health care programs; and unfair competition.33  
A violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute is punishable as a felony.  
Individuals convicted of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute shall be fined 
not more than $100,000, imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both.34  
A prosecutor is not required to prove a defendant’s actual knowledge of, 
or specific intent to violate, the Anti-Kickback Statute in order to 
successfully prosecute the defendant.35  A violation of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute can also subject a defendant to exclusion from participation in 
federal health care programs as well as civil monetary penalties.36 
Over time, federal courts have interpreted key provisions within the 
Anti-Kickback Statute.37  In 1985, for example, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit established the “one purpose” rule in the case 
of United States v. Greber.38  Greber involved a cardiologist (Defendant) 
                                                          
 32.   42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 33.   A Roadmap for New Physicians: Fraud and Abuse Laws, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., OFF. INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/physician-education/index.asp 
[https://perma.cc/25W7-7H6L] (last visited Mar. 18, 2019) (listing concerns raised by health care 
kickbacks). 
 34.   42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), (2) (as amended by the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-123, § 50412(a), (b), 132 Stat. 64 (Feb. 9, 2018) (increasing the fines and sentences applicable 
to violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute)). 
 35.   42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h) (“With respect to violations of this section, a person need not have 
actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.”). 
 36.   42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (authorizing the Secretary of HHS to exclude any individual from 
federal health care programs if the individual violates the Anti-Kickback Statute); id. § 1320a-7a(a)(7) 
(stating that any individual who violates the Anti-Kickback Statute shall, in addition to any other 
penalties that may be imposed, be subject to civil money penalties). 
 37.   See United States v. Kats, 871 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a judge’s 
admonition to the jury that the jury could convict defendant for receipt of kickbacks in exchange for 
referral of Medicare payments, “unless it found payment ‘wholly and not incidentally attributable to 
delivery of goods or services,’” was accurate); United States v. Borrasi, 639 F.3d 774, 782 (7th Cir. 
2011) (ruling that the portion of payments received by the defendant that compensated him for his past 
referrals or induced future referrals for health care services paid for by Medicare violated the Anti-
Kickback Statute: “Nothing in the Medicare fraud statute implies that only the primary motivation of 
remuneration is to be considered in assessing [the defendant’s] conduct.  We join our sister circuits in 
holding that if part of the payment compensated past referrals or induced future referrals, that portion 
of the payment violates [the Anti-Kickback Statute]”); United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 
(5th Cir. 1998) (affirming trial court’s decision to deny a requested instruction that the jury may find 
the defendant guilty of conspiracy only if it finds that the defendant’s cash payments to a particular 
physician “were ‘for no other purpose’ than ‘inducing the referral of Medicare patients’”). 
 38.   760 F.2d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 1985). 
2019 FRAUD, ABUSE, AND OPIOIDS 907 
who served as President of Cardio-Med., Inc. (Cardio-Med), a company 
that provided diagnostic services.39  When a physician ordered a diagnostic 
service from Cardio-Med for a Medicare beneficiary, Cardio-Med would 
bill Medicare for the service and, after receiving reimbursement, would 
forward a portion of the reimbursement, referred to as a “consulting fee,” 
to the ordering physician.40  The Defendant testified that if he did not pay 
the physicians their “consulting fees,” the physicians would not order 
diagnostic services from Cardio-Med.41 
At trial, the judge instructed the jury that if one purpose of the 
“consulting fees” paid to the physicians was to induce their ordering of 
services from Cardio-Med, the Anti-Kickback Statute had been violated.42  
Defendant argued that the jury charge was erroneous; that is, the Statute 
was violated only when the only purpose behind the fees was to improperly 
induce patient referrals.43  The Third Circuit upheld the trial court’s 
instruction, ruling that the Anti-Kickback Statute was violated when one 
purpose of the fees was to induce the use of Cardio-Med’s services, even 
if the payments were also intended to compensate the physicians for other 
consulting services.44 
In addition to interpretive case law, the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) has promulgated a number of safe harbor regulations.45  These 
regulations carve out shelters for arrangements that do not violate the Anti-
Kickback Statute even though the arrangements may, on their face, appear 
to be capable of inducing referrals in violation of the Statute.46  
Arrangements sheltered under the safe harbor regulations include, but are 
not limited to, certain equipment rental payments, personal services 
payments, management payments, sale of practice payments, warranty 
payments, practitioner recruitment payments, payments to group 
purchasing organizations, obstetrical malpractice insurance subsidies, 
non-monetary remuneration necessary for electronic health records, and 
non-monetary remuneration necessary for electronic prescribing.47  
Common among sheltered payments is the requirement that the payment 
                                                          
 39.   Id. at 69–70. 
 40.   Id. 
 41.   Id. at 70. 
 42.   Id. at 71. 
 43.   Id. 
 44.   Id. at 72. 
 45.   42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)-(bb) (2017). 
 46.   See Jeffrey Schwartz, Elaborating on Sham Transactions as Evidence of Violations of the 
Anti-Kickback Statute, 13 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 357, 367–68 (2003) (discussing the safe harbor 
regulations). 
 47.   42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(a)–(bb). 
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be consistent with fair market value in an arms-length transaction and not 
determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any 
referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part under a federal health care 
program.48 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) actively enforces the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.  As a recent example, the DOJ announced in August 2018 that 
Reliant Rehabilitation Holdings (Reliant), a provider of rehabilitation 
services in north Texas, agreed to pay $6.1 million to resolve allegations 
that Reliant paid illegal remuneration to nursing homes and doctors in 
connection with care provided to Medicare and Medicaid patients.49  
United States Attorneys for the Northern District of Texas argued that 
Reliant offered nursing homes illegal remuneration, including nurse-
practitioner services at free or below-market-value rates, “in order to 
induce or reward nursing homes for contracting with Reliant to provide 
rehabilitation therapy for their residents.”50 
Even more recently, the DOJ announced in November 2018 the 
conviction of fifty-six-year-old Sophia Eggleston, a patient recruiter from 
Detroit, Michigan, on two counts of receiving kickbacks in violation of the 
Anti-Kickback Statute.51  After a three-day trial in the Eastern District of 
Michigan, a federal jury found that Eggleston participated in an illegal 
kickback scheme between 2009 and 2012 pursuant to which she “solicited 
and received kickbacks in exchange for referring Medicare beneficiaries 
to serve as patients at a home health agency owned by Eggleston’s co-
                                                          
 48.   Id. § 1001.952(b)(5) (including within the space rental safe harbor a requirement that the 
aggregate space rental charge be “consistent with fair market value in arms-length transactions and is 
not determined in a manner that takes into account the volume or value of any referrals or business 
otherwise generated between the parties for which payment may be made in whole or in part under 
Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care programs.”); id. § 1001.952(d)(5) (including within 
the personal services and management contracts safe harbor a requirement that the “aggregate 
compensation paid to the agent over the term of the agreement is set in advance, is consistent with fair 
market value in arms-length transactions and is not determined in a manner that takes into account the 
volume or value of any referrals or business otherwise generated between the parties for which 
payment may be made in whole or in part under Medicare, Medicaid or other Federal health care 
programs.”). 
 49.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Reliant to Pay $6.1 Million to 
Settle False Claims Act Allegations That It Paid Kickbacks to Nursing Homes for Rehabilitation 
Therapy Business (Aug. 23, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/reliant-pay-61-million-settle-
false-claims-act-allegations-it-paid-kickbacks-nursing-homes [https://perma.cc/8TYB-ASTU] 
[hereinafter Reliant Press Release] (announcing the settlement); see also Order of Dismissal, United 
States ex rel. Prose v. Reliant Rehab., No. 3:16-cv-0707 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2018). 
 50.   Reliant Press Release, supra note 49. 
 51.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Patient Recruiter Convicted in 
$1.1 Million Kickback Scheme (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/patient-recruiter-
convicted-11-million-kickback-scheme [https://perma.cc/P9UT-MENM].  
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conspirators.”52  The scheme resulted in the submission of approximately 
$1.1 million in claims to Medicare for home health services purportedly 
provided to the referred Medicare beneficiaries.53 
B. Application to the Opioid Context 
1. Physician Receipt of Remuneration from Pharmaceutical Companies 
in Return for Opioid Prescriptions 
A number of physicians have been convicted of violating the Anti-
Kickback Statute for receiving remuneration from pharmaceutical 
companies in return for the prescription of opioids manufactured by those 
companies.  In March 2018, for example, Judge John McConnell of the 
United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island sentenced 
sixty-three-year-old Dr. Jerrold Rosenberg, a Brown University faculty 
member, to fifty-one months in prison and $754,736 in restitution for 
receiving $188,000 in sham speaker fees from Insys Therapeutics, Inc. 
(Insys) between 2012 and 2015.54 
As background, Insys manufactures and markets Subsys, a highly 
addictive, fentanyl-based, sublingual spray drug approved by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) for opioid-tolerant, adult cancer patients who 
experience break-through cancer pain.55  Due to concerns regarding life-
threatening respiratory depression and death, the FDA has contraindicated 
Subsys for use in opioid non-tolerant, non-cancer patients, including 
patients who experience post-operative pain as well as headaches, back 
pain, and joint pain.56 
Dr. Rosenberg, a Subsys prescriber, admitted that he received the 
speaker fees from Insys even when he did not make any type of 
presentation on Insys’s behalf and when presentation sign-in sheets were 
forged to include the names of health care practitioners with prescriptive 
authority who did not attend the (nonexistent) presentations.57  Although 
                                                          
 52.   Id. 
 53.   Id. 
 54.   Janelle Lawrence & Jef Feeley, Ivy League Doctor Gets 4 Years in Prison for Insys Opioid 
Kickbacks, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 9, 2018, 1:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-
03-09/ivy-league-doctor-gets-4-years-prison-for-insys-opioid-kickbacks [https://perma.cc/9XLV-
ZNXL]. 
 55.   Second Amended Complaint for Violations of the False Claims Act & State False Claims 
Acts at 6, ¶¶ 25–26, Filed Under Seal, United States ex rel. Guzman v. INSYS Therapeutic Inc., No. 
2:13-cv-05861 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2016) [hereinafter Guzman Second Amended Complaint]. 
 56.   Id. at 27, ¶ 140. 
 57.   Benjamin Weiser & Katie Thomas, 5 Doctors Are Charged with Taking Kickbacks for 
Fentanyl Prescriptions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 16, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
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the pharmaceutical industry has long paid influential doctors to give 
presentations to peer prescribers as part of drug marketing campaigns,58 
Dr. Rosenberg admitted that the sham speaker fees paid by Insys played a 
role in his decision to prescribe Subsys, including his decision to prescribe 
Subsys for ineligible patients; that is, opioid non-tolerant patients whose 
pain was not caused by cancer.59  Perhaps worse than his acceptance of 
sham speaker fees in return for his writing of Subsys prescriptions, federal 
prosecutors also showed that Dr. Rosenberg “ignored and bullied patients 
who resisted staying on the powerful pain-killing spray.”60  During 
sentencing, Judge McConnell told Dr. Rosenberg: “You in effect sold your 
medical license to a pharmaceutical company”61 and reminded the 
disgraced physician that “[g]reed has no role in that sacred relationship 
that exists between a doctor and a patient.”62  As discussed above, the Anti-
Kickback Statute is premised on a number of concerns, including 
corruption of medical decision making.63  Dr. Rosenberg’s receipt of 
remuneration from Insys corrupted his medical decision making, even to 
the point where he bullied addicted patients—including those who 
requested assistance with stopping Subsys—into staying on Subsys. 
Dr. Rosenberg is not the only physician who received remuneration 
from Insys in return for writing Subsys prescriptions for federal health care 
program patients.  In February 2018, Judge Arthur Tarnow of the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan sentenced fifty-
nine-year-old Dr. Gavin Awerbuch to thirty-two months in prison and $4.1 
million in restitution and fines after finding that, among other 
improprieties, Dr. Awerbuch received from Insys $138,435 in sham 
                                                          
03/16/nyregion/fentanyl-subsys-drug-kickbacks.html [https://perma.cc/TBR8-HEHQ]. 
 58.   Katie Thomas, Using Doctors with Troubled Pasts to Market a Painkiller, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
27, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/business/drug-maker-gave-large-payments-to-
doctors-with-troubled-track-records.html [https://perma.cc/P5FT-ZVN7] (“The drug industry has 
long paid influential doctors to speak to peers as a way of building word-of-mouth marketing.”); 
Charlotte Hu, Opioid Overdose Deaths Are Highest in Places Where Pharma Spends the Most on 
Marketing, A New Study Finds, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 13, 2018, 10:07 AM), 
https://www.businessinsider.com/relationship-between-opioid-deaths-and-pharma-marketing-
spending-2018-11 [https://perma.cc/M8HY-WG9V] (“In 2016, the pharmaceutical industry doled out 
nearly $10 million to US physicians for opioid-related marketing.  That includes speaking and 
consulting fees . . . .”). 
 59.   Nate Raymond, Doctor in Insys Opioid Kickback Scheme Gets Four Years in Prison, 
REUTERS (Mar. 9, 2018, 5:03 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/doctor-in-insys-
opioid-kickback-scheme-gets-four-years-in-prison-idUSKCN1GL1DP [https://perma.cc/K3L3-
3JUQ]. 
 60.   Lawrence & Feeley, supra note 54.  
 61.   Id. 
 62.   Raymond, supra note 59. 
 63.   See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
2019 FRAUD, ABUSE, AND OPIOIDS 911 
speaker fees in return for prescribing Subsys, including for patients who 
had no legitimate medical need for the drug.64  In the six-month period 
prior to Dr. Awerbuch making his first (alleged) speech in October 2012 
on Insys’s behalf, Dr. Awerbuch wrote, on average, fewer than thirteen 
prescriptions for Subsys each month.  In the six months after his first 
(alleged) speech on Insys’s behalf, Dr. Awerbuch wrote, on average, 
approximately 118 prescriptions for Subsys each month.65  Dr. Awerbuch 
was the highest prescriber of Subsys to Medicare beneficiaries nationally, 
writing more than twenty percent of all Subsys prescriptions for Medicare 
beneficiaries between 2009 and 2015.66  The cost to Medicare of the 1,283 
Medicare beneficiary prescriptions written by Dr. Awerbuch reached 
nearly $7 million.67 
Drs. Rosenberg and Awerbuch are not the only physicians who have 
violated the Anti-Kickback Statute in the context of opioid prescriptions.  
In February 2017, an Alabama jury found that Drs. John Patrick Couch 
and Xiulu Ruan received remuneration from Insys and other 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in return for writing opioid prescriptions in 
violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.68  As background, Drs. Couch and 
Ruan owned and operated a practice in Mobile, Alabama, called 
Physician’s Pain Specialists of Alabama (PPSA).69  Between 2012 and 
2015, Dr. Couch received at least $100,000 in sham speaking fees and Dr. 
Ruan received at least $170,000 in sham speaking fees from Insys.70  An 
Insys Sales Representative named Natalie Perhacs admitted in her own 
guilty plea (in which she admitted that she paid remuneration to Drs. 
Couch and Ruan in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute) that she 
                                                          
 64.   Steve Friess, Doctor Tied to Insys Opioid Kickback Probe Gets Prison Term, REUTERS (Feb. 
26, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-opioids/doctor-tied-to-insys-opioid-
kickback-probe-gets-prison-term-idUSKCN1GA2WE [https://perma.cc/68GH-Z6U7]. 
 65.   United States’ Complaint in Intervention at 17, ¶ 63, U.S. v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 
14-cv-3488 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 13, 2018) [hereinafter U.S. Complaint in Intervention]. 
 66.   Catherine Shaffer, Founder of Opioid Company Arrested on Racketeering and Fraud 
Charges, MICH. RADIO NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017), http://www.michiganradio.org/post/founder-opioid-
company-arrested-racketeering-and-fraud-charges [https://perma.cc/79WB-LHDP] (“Awerbuch 
wrote more than twenty percent of Subsys prescriptions for Medicare beneficiaries nationwide 
between 2009 and 2014.  Awerbuch pled guilty to health care fraud and distribution of controlled 
substances in 2016.”). 
 67.   Guzman Second Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 24, ¶ 123. 
 68.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S. Dist. of Ala., Dr. Couch and 
Dr. Ruan Sentenced to 240 and 252 Months in Federal Prison for Running Massive Pill Mill (May 26, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdal/pr/dr-couch-and-dr-ruan-sentenced-240-and-252-months-
federal-prison-running-massive-pill [https://perma.cc/DZ9F-YPKU] [hereinafter Couch and Ruan 
Press Release]. 
 69.   Id. 
 70.   Id. 
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scheduled approximately one speaker program per week for Drs. Couch 
and Ruan but that, for the majority of such programs, the physicians either: 
(1) spoke to the same prescribers over and over again about Subsys; (2) 
spoke to non-prescribing PPSA staff about Subsys; or (3) did not speak 
about Subsys at all,71 thus negating any substantive justification for the 
speaker programs and, therefore, the speaker payments.  During the year 
2014, Drs. Couch and Ruan were writing opioid prescriptions as fast as 
one prescription every four minutes.72  The total cost to the government of 
these prescriptions was $15.5 million.73 
At the conclusion of their seven-week trial, the jury found the 
Alabama-based physicians guilty of several federal criminal offenses, 
including receiving remuneration from Insys in return for prescribing 
Subsys in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.74  Some of the patients 
for whom Drs. Couch and Ruan prescribed Subsys included non-cancer 
patients who experienced traditional neck, back, and joint pain; that is, 
patients for whom the FDA expressly contraindicated Subsys.  In May 
2017, Senior Judge Callie Virginia Smith Granade of the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of Alabama sentenced Drs. Couch 
and Ruan to twenty and twenty-one years in prison, respectively.75 
2. Non-Physician Receipt of Remuneration from Pharmaceutical 
Companies in Return for Opioid Prescriptions 
The above section described three cases involving four physicians 
who admitted they received, or who were found by a jury to have received, 
remuneration in the form of sham speaker fees in return for opioid 
prescriptions in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.  Other non-
physician prescribers, including nurse practitioners and physician 
assistants, also have accepted remuneration from pharmaceutical 
companies in return from prescribing opioids manufactured by those 
companies in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute. 
                                                          
 71.   See United States’ Complaint in Intervention, supra note 64, at 14–15, ¶ 49. 
 72.   J.B. Biunno, Mobile Pain Doctors Found Guilty of Running Pill Mill, NEWS5 WKRG (Feb. 
23, 2018, 10:45 AM), https://www.wkrg.com/news/local-news/breaking-mobile-pain-doctors-found-
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 73.   Jill Riepenhoff, Case Study: Drs. John P. Couch and Xiulu Ruan, ABC7 WWSB (Feb. 26, 
2018, 3:46 PM), http://www.mysuncoast.com/story/37546844/case-study-drs-john-p-couch-and-
xiulu-ruan/ [https://perma.cc/Z6ZZ-DZ3Z] (last updated Oct. 17, 2018, 7:01 PM). 
 74.   Couch and Ruan Press Release, supra note 68. 
 75.   Id. 
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For example, Heather Alfonso, a Connecticut-licensed nurse 
practitioner who worked at the Comprehensive Pain and Headache 
Treatment Center in Derby, Connecticut, pled guilty in June 2015 to 
receiving kickbacks from Insys in return for prescribing Subsys.76  
Prosecutors showed that between January 2013 and March 2015, Ms. 
Alfonso received approximately $83,000 in speaker fees from Insys for 
participating in more than seventy “dinner programs.”77  Frequently, the 
only attendee at these “dinner programs” was an Insys sales representative 
or a friend or co-worker of Ms. Alfonso who had no prescriptive 
authority,78 thus negating any substantive justification for the program.  
Ms. Alfonso, who was one of the top-ten highest prescribers of Subsys in 
the U.S., admitted that the speaker fees she accepted influenced her 
prescription of the highly-addictive drug, including for non-cancer 
patients who had chronic pain not associated with cancer:79  “If I was going 
to choose between one drug or another, I would choose the Subsys because 
that’s what I was getting paid for.”80  Judge Michael Shea of the United 
States District Court for the District of Connecticut has delayed Ms. 
Alfonso’s sentencing numerous times due to her cooperation with federal 
and state investigators in other health care fraud cases.81 
The Government has investigated other non-physician opioid 
prescribers, including physician assistants, for their receipt of 
remuneration from pharmaceutical manufacturers in violation of the Anti-
Kickback Statute.  In March 2017, for example, physician assistant 
Christopher Clough was indicted for accepting remuneration from Insys 
in return for prescribing Subsys.82  Mr. Clough treated pain patients in 
                                                          
 76.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of Conn., APRN Admits 
Receiving Kickbacks from Drug Company for Prescribing Pain Medication (June 23, 2015), 
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maker.html [https://perma.cc/3F2K-G2TP]. 
 77.   Alfonso Press Release, supra note 76. 
 78.   Id. 
 79.   Lisa Chedekel, Case Against Derby Nurse Involves Potent Painkiller, HARTFORD COURANT 
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20150624-story.html [https://perma.cc/JYE9-AXWJ]. 
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BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-
12/opioid-nurse-sold-out-patients-for-82-000-in-insys-kickbacks [https://perma.cc/BMR4-49E2]. 
 81.   Id.; Lisa Chedekel, Derby Nurse’s Sentencing Delayed Six Months, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 
24, 2017, 11:38 AM), https://www.nhregister.com/connecticut/article/Derby-nurse-s-sentencing-
delayed-six-months-11313986.php [https://perma.cc/3C7D-WNAP]. 
 82.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Dist. of N.H., Former Physician 
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Somersworth, New Hampshire and is alleged to have received 
approximately $40,000 in speaker fees from Insys.83  As with the other 
Subsys prescribers discussed above, Mr. Clough likely gave no 
presentations to peer prescribers at all and/or sign-in sheets were forged to 
include the names of prescriber attendees who did not attend the (likely 
non-existent) presentations.84 
3. Prescriber Receipt of Remuneration from Pharmacists in Return for 
Opioid Prescriptions Filled at Related Pharmacies 
In addition to prescribers who have received remuneration from 
pharmaceutical companies in return for prescriptions of opioids 
manufactured by those same companies, prescribers also have received 
remuneration from pharmacists in return for opioid prescriptions that were 
filled at related pharmacies.  For example, Dr. Carl Dennis Fowler, a sixty-
one-year-old physician who practiced family medicine in West 
Bloomfield, Michigan, was convicted in March 2014 of receiving 
remuneration in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute.85  As background, 
Michigan pharmacist Babubhai Patel (Patel) owned and operated twenty-
six pharmacies (the Patel Pharmacies) in the greater Detroit area.86  Dr. 
Fowler wrote numerous prescriptions for expensive drugs, without regard 
to whether the drugs were medically necessary, that could be filled at one 
of the Patel Pharmacies, as well as prescriptions for OxyContin and 
oxycodone, which were later resold on the street market.87  A jury found 
that Dr. Fowler received from Patel bribes and kickbacks in return for Dr. 
Fowler’s prescription of expensive drugs, including opioids, that were 




                                                          
Assistant Charged in Healthcare Kickback Scheme (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-
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 83.   Id. 
 84.   Id. 
 85.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, E. Dist. of Mich., Jury Convicts 
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 86.   Id. 
 87.   Id. 
 88.   Id. 
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4. Physician Receipt of Remuneration from Laboratories in Return for 
Drug Test Orders 
The sections above described cases involving prescribers who 
received remuneration in return for writing opioid prescriptions for 
government program patients.  Other cases implicating the Anti-Kickback 
Statute involve physicians who receive remuneration in return for 
referring government program patients to particular laboratories for opioid 
and other drug testing services.  In June 2017, for example, Judge Kim R. 
Gibson of the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania sentenced Dr. John H. Johnson, a Pennsylvania-licensed 
physician who owned and operated a number of pain management clinics, 
to eighty-four months in prison and $2.3 million in restitution upon Dr. 
Johnson’s conviction of violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute among 
other laws.89 
As background, Dr. Johnson had entered into a joint venture with 
William Hughes, the owner of Universal Oral Fluids Lab (UOFL), 
pursuant to which Dr. Johnson referred all of his patients, including his 
Medicare and Medicaid patients, to UOFL for drug testing and related 
services.90  After UOFL billed third-party payors, including Medicare and 
Medicaid, UOFL kicked back to Dr. Johnson an amount for each referred 
patient whose laboratory tests exceeded a certain dollar threshold, 
typically $100 to $150.91  The evidence presented at trial showed that Dr. 
Johnson received these kickbacks “solely in exchange for the referrals Dr. 
Johnson provided to UOFL, and not in exchange for the performance of 
any other services.”92  The evidence also showed that UOFL received 
approximately $3,443,528 from Medicare and $1,147,768 from 
Pennsylvania Medicaid based on Dr. Johnson’s referrals alone and that Dr. 
Johnson received more than $2,300,000 in kickbacks from UOFL between 
May 2011 and November 2013.93  As discussed above, the Anti-Kickback 
Statute is premised on a number of concerns, including patient steering, 
overutilization of health care services, and increased costs to federal health 
care programs.94  The joint venture between Dr. Johnson and UOFL 
                                                          
 89.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, W. Dist. of Pa., Physician 
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clearly raises concerns regarding patient steering to UOFL (versus other 
laboratories), overutilization of drug testing services, and increased costs 
to Medicare and Pennsylvania Medicaid. 
Another similar, drug-testing-referral scheme involved two pain 
management physicians, Drs. Malik and Sherlekar, who owned practices 
in Maryland and New Jersey.95  A jury found that Dr. Malik accepted 
remuneration from Accu-Reference, a New Jersey-based clinical 
laboratory, in return for referring urine toxicology specimens to Accu-
Reference for opioid and other forms of drug testing.96  In particular, the 
Government introduced evidence showing that, between April 2011 and 
July 2012, Drs. Malik and Sherlekar referred between 700 and 1,300 
patient samples to Accu-Reference per month, resulting in billing claims 
to Medicare and private insurers of approximately $4.4 million in 
exchange for $1.4 million in kickbacks.97  Drs. Malik and Sherlekar each 
received $240,000 of the kicked-back amounts while their former practice 
CEO and CFO, who received the offer of remuneration from Accu-
Reference and brought the offer to Drs. Malik and Sherlekar, received the 
remainder of the remuneration.98  On September 11, 2018, Dr. Malik was 
sentenced to eight years in prison.99 
5. Offer or Payment of Remuneration 
In addition to prohibiting the solicitation or receipt of remuneration in 
return for federal health care program business, the Anti-Kickback Statute 
also prohibits the offer or payment of such remuneration.100  Several 
individuals have pled guilty to offering or paying remuneration to 
individuals with prescriptive authority in violation of the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.  For example, Jeffrey Pearlman, an Insys district sales manager 
responsible for Insys sales in New Jersey, New York, Connecticut, and 
Rhode Island, pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the Anti-
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Kickback Statute in August 2018.101  In his plea agreement, Pearlman 
admitted to conspiring to induce physicians, physician assistants, and 
nurse practitioners to prescribe Subsys by paying them speaker fees “that 
ranged from $1,000 to several thousand dollars.”102  As in the other 
speaker fee cases discussed above, the speaker fees paid by Pearlman 
were, in theory, to help Insys educate opioid prescribers about Subsys.103  
In reality, the presentations were non-educational gatherings held at 
expensive restaurants attended by friends and co-workers, most of whom 
did not have prescriptive authority,104 thus negating the substantive 
justification for the speaker programs and, thus, the speaker fees.  One 
such dinner occurred at a restaurant in New Haven, Connecticut, where 
Pearlman paid a Connecticut-licensed physician a speaker fee even though 
the physician did not make any type of educational presentation, and even 
though no other health care professionals with prescriptive authority were 
present to learn from the (non-existent) presentation.105  Pearlman’s 
sentencing was originally scheduled for October 31, 2018, although it 
appears to have been delayed.106 
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Several opioid manufacturers also have settled allegations of 
violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute’s offer or payment prohibitions.  
For example, in September 2017, the DOJ announced that Galena 
Biopharma, Inc. (Galena) would pay more than $7.55 million to resolve 
allegations that it violated the federal False Claims Act by violating the 
Anti-Kickback Statute; that is, by paying remuneration to physicians to 
induce the physicians to prescribe Galena’s fentanyl-based drug, 
Abstral.107  In particular, the Government alleged that Galena offered and 
paid both in-kind and cash remuneration to physicians to induce their 
prescriptions, including: (1) “providing more than 85 free meals to 
physicians and staff from a single, high-prescribing, [medical] practice”; 
(2) paying physicians and speakers between $5,000 and $6,000 to attend a 
questionable “advisory board” meeting that was planned and attended only 
by Galena sales team members; (3) “paying approximately $92,000 to a 
physician-owned pharmacy under a performance-based rebate agreement 
to induce the pharmacy owners[,]” none other than Alabama-based Drs. 
Couch and Ruan, to prescribe Abstral; and (4) paying physicians to refer 
patients to the company’s patient registry study that ostensibly was 
designed to collect data on patient experiences with Abstral but in reality 
served as a means to induce physicians to prescribe Abstral.108  In the press 
release announcing the settlement, William E. Fitzpatrick, the Acting 
United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey stated, “The conduct 
alleged by the government and resolved by today’s settlement was 
egregious because it incentivized doctors to over-prescribe highly 
addictive opioids.”109 
Other opioid manufacturers also have initiated settlement discussions 
regarding allegations of violations of the offer or pay prohibitions within 
the Anti-Kickback Statute.  On August 8, 2018, the media (perhaps 
presumptuously) reported that Insys would pay at least $150 million to 
settle DOJ allegations that it violated the offer or pay prohibitions within 
the Anti-Kickback Statute including in connection with payments made to 
many of the recipients discussed earlier in this Article.110  The media 
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Kickback Probe, REUTERS (Aug. 8, 2018, 7:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-insys-
opioids/insys-to-pay-150-million-to-settle-u-s-opioid-kickback-probe-idUSKBN1KT1G5 
[https://perma.cc/4RPZ-4E2T] (announcing the settlement). 
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further reported on that same date that Insys would pay the $150 million 
over five years and would potentially make up to $75 million in additional 
payments.111  The media quoted Insys CEO Saeed Motahari as stating, 
“This [settlement] is a very important step for our company to move 
forward and continue our transformative efforts to foster a compliant and 
ethical culture.”112  On February 5, 2019, a status report filed with the 
United States District Court for the Central District of California 
referenced a “settlement-in-principle” that was allegedly reached by and 
between the federal and state government plaintiffs and Insys on August 9 
[not 8], 2018; however, that filing also stated that “discussions regarding 
these settlement issues . . . are currently ongoing and remain incomplete.  
Among other things, the parties continue to discuss and attempt to resolve 
various criminal, civil, and administrative issues towards the finalization 
of the settlement-in-principle reached by them in August 2018.”113 
The Insys settlement discussions have their roots in five separate qui 
tam cases, including the first qui tam case that was filed under seal by 
relator Maria Guzman in August 2013.114  In April 2018, the U.S. 
Government intervened in the five (now consolidated) cases,115 which 
were partially unsealed in May 2018.116  Guzman’s complaint alleges that 
Insys sales representatives paid Subsys prescribers speaker fees117 and 
other cash amounts as high as $100,000118 as well as in-kind remuneration 
including stock options,119 sexual favors,120 escort services,121 strip 
                                                          
 111.   Id. 
 112.   Id. 
 113.   United States of America’s Status Report at 3–4, United States ex rel. Guzmam v. Insys 
Therapeutics, No. 2:13-cv-5861-JLS (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2019). 
 114.   Complaint, United States ex. rel. Guzman v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-5861-
JLS (AJWx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Guzman First Complaint]; Guzman Second 
Amended Complaint, supra note 55.  See generally Michael Filoromo & Matthew LaGarde, Insight: 
Leveraging the False Claims Act to Combat Opioid Misuse, BLOOMBERG L. (Aug. 2, 2018, 9:01 AM), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/XCMEEI70000000?bna_news_filter=health-law-and-
business&jcsearch=BNA%252000000164f57fdb1faff7fd7f517c0002#jcite [https://perma.cc/394U-
F2HX] (noting that relator Maria Guzman filed the first of the five underlying qui tam actions and that 
all five actions were ultimately consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the 
Central District of California).  
 115.   U.S. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 65. 
 116.   Order Unsealing Cases, United States v. Insys Therapeutics, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-5861 JLS 
(AJWx) (C.D. Cal., May 11, 2018). 
 117.   Guzman Second Amended Complaint, supra note 55, at 14–17, ¶¶ 66–84. 
 118.   Id. at 12, ¶ 58. 
 119.   Id. 
 120.   Id. at 8, ¶ 38. 
 121.   Id. at 11, ¶ 53. 
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dances,122 trips to shooting ranges,123 lunches for physician office staff,124 
coolers of filet mignon steaks,125 and the hiring of prescribers’ significant 
others126 in return for the prescription of Subsys. 
The factual allegations set forth in the consolidated qui tam actions 
against Insys are bold and specific.  For example, one of the lawsuits 
quotes a text message written by an Insys employee stating, “Don’t worry 
about [the physicians’] speaking abilities. They do not need to be good 
speakers.  They need to write a lot of Subsys.”127  Statements like these 
provide strong evidence that the purpose of the Insys speaker programs 
was not to educate peer prescribers but, instead, to exchange remuneration 
for selected speakers’ writing of Subsys prescriptions. 
By further example, the same lawsuit quotes a text message sent by an 
Insys employee to a particular physician who not only practiced medicine 
but also owned a restaurant.  The text message to the physician stated, “‘I 
can commit to 100k to you via speaker programs or meals towards your 
restaurant.  We don’t need the food, just charge our card and give [us] an 
itemized receipt.  Just need your support on [S]ubsys.’”128  When the Insys 
employee stated that Insys does not need the food provided by the 
physician’s restaurant, the Insys employee is eliminating the only 
legitimate reason for Insys’s payment to the restaurant.  Then, when the 
Insys employee stated that Insys “[j]ust need[s] your support on 
[S]ubsys,”129 the employee is essentially admitting that the purpose of the 
payment is to induce Subsys prescriptions. 
The same lawsuit also quotes a text message written by an Insys 
employee to a potential prescribing physician stating that the employee 
wants to know if the physician’s girlfriend would like a full-time job 
working for the employee.130  The text message further states, “I could also 
use a few Subsys prescriptions.  We have not seen anything, I want to have 
some fun!!! Can’t do it [without] [S]ubsys scripts coming in at least once 
a day.  Have [your girlfriend] call me next week.”131  This text message is 
strong evidence that the Insys employee is willing to hire the physician’s 
                                                          
 122.   Id. at 18, ¶ 86. 
 123.   Id. at 19, ¶ 92. 
 124.   Id. 
 125.   Id. at 25–26, ¶ 131. 
 126.   Id. at 12, ¶ 58. 
 127.   Id. at 15, ¶ 70. 
 128.   Id. at 16, ¶ 75. 
 129.   Id. 
 130.   Id. at 22, ¶ 116.  
 131.   Id. 
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girlfriend in exchange for the physician writing at least one Subsys 
prescription per day.  Stated another way, the hiring of the girlfriend 
appears to be in-kind remuneration offered in return for Subsys 
prescriptions. 
On November 6, 2018, the media reported that Insys was looking to 
sell its opioid-related assets, including Subsys.132  It is likely that the 
company’s allegedly looming $150 million settlement payment, its 
inability to further trade remuneration for Subsys prescriptions, and the 
negative press associated with Insys’s role in the still-strong opioid crisis, 
impacted this decision. 
III. THE FEDERAL CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
A. Background 
In addition to the Anti-Kickback Statute, the federal government has 
other tools designed to combat opioid fraud and abuse, including the 
federal civil False Claims Act (FCA).  The FCA creates civil liability for 
any person who: (1) “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false 
or fraudulent claim for payment or approval” to the federal government, 
including a false Medicare or Medicaid claim; (2) “knowingly makes, 
uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement [that is] 
material to a false or fraudulent claim”; (3) knowingly uses a false 
statement to decrease an obligation to pay money to the government; and 
(4) conspires with respect to the preceding conduct, among other illegal 
conduct.133  Examples of Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal claims 
that violate the FCA include claims for health care services not actually 
provided, claims that misrepresent the level of health care services that 
were provided (e.g., up-coding a health care service to receive a higher 
level of reimbursement), claims for unnecessary health care services, 
claims for health care services performed by health care providers 
excluded from participating in federal health care programs, and the 
submission of false information about a health care service provided or a 
charge for such service.134  Knowing conduct includes conduct involving 
                                                          
 132.   Maria Armental, Insys Looks to Sell Opioid-Related Assets, Including Subsys, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 6, 2018, 12:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/insys-looks-to-sell-opioid-related-assets-
including-subsys-1541482212 [https://perma.cc/47WF-GZEG]. 
 133.   31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), and (G) (2012); id. § 3729(b)(2) (defining claim). 
 134.   See generally Magellan Health Services, Inc., Fraud, Waste and Abuse Training for 
Medicare and Medicaid Providers PowerPoint, at PowerPoint Slides 13–14, 
https://www.magellanprovider.com/MHS/MGL/about/handbooks/supplements/fwa_training.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8K2B-8HUR] (last visited Mar. 18, 2019) (listing illustrative examples of FCA 
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actual knowledge of a falsehood as well as conduct involving deliberate 
ignorance or reckless disregard of the truth.135 
Per the terms of the FCA, individuals who violate the law are “liable 
to the federal government for a civil penalty of not less than $5,000 and 
not more than $10,000, as thereafter may be adjusted by the Federal Civil 
Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 [(FCPIIA)], plus three times 
the amount of damages” (called “treble damages”).136  For penalties 
assessed after January 29, 2018, the most recent FCPIIA adjustment has 
increased the civil penalty range from not less than $11,181 to not more 
than $22,363.137  Because the FCA is a civil statute, the burden of proof 
for an FCA violation is the preponderance of the evidence standard.138 
Claims that violate the FCA may be classified as factually false or 
legally false.  Factually false claims include claims or supporting 
documentation that are false on their face, such as claims that knowingly 
contain improper codes, claims for (nonexistent) care provided to fictitious 
patients, and claims supported by falsified medical record or other 
documentation.139  Legally false claims are different than factually false 
claims in that they may, at first glance, appear to be facially, technically 
accurate in the sense that a provider may have seen a patient in the office 
for a twenty-five-minute visit and the accompanying claim may state that 
a twenty-five-minute office visit occurred.140  However, because the 
provider failed to meet an applicable statute or regulation in connection 
with the office visit, the claim for the visit is classified as legally false.141 
                                                          
violations). 
 135.   31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1) (2012). 
 136.   Id. § 3729(a)(1) (setting forth these statutory amounts). 
 137.   Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, Final Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 3944-01, 3945 (Jan. 
29, 2018) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 85), https://www.federalregister.gov/ 
documents/2018/01/29/2018-01464/civil-monetary-penalties-inflation-adjustment [https://perma.cc/ 
PW6A-NTBX] (setting forth new amounts that apply for violations after certain dates in 2017 and 
2018). 
 138.   31 U.S.C. § 3731(d) (2012) (“In any action brought under Section 3730, the United States 
shall be required to prove all essential elements of the cause of action, including damages, by a 
preponderance of the evidence.”). 
 139.   See Burke v. Record Press, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 2d 26, 30 (D.D.C. 2013) (“‘A claim can be 
“factually false if it invoices for services that were not rendered” or incorrectly describes goods or 
services provided.’”); Christopher L. Martin, Jr., Reining in Lincoln’s Law: A Call to Limit the Implied 
Certification Theory of Liability Under the False Claims Act, 101 CAL. L. REV. 227, 230 (2013) 
(“Courts originally interpreted the phrase ‘false or fraudulent claim’ in a limited fashion to mean a 
‘factually false claim,’ which is a claim for payment containing ‘an incorrect description of goods or 
services provided or a request for reimbursement for goods or services never provided.’”). 
 140.   Burke, 951 F. Supp. 2d at 30. 
 141.   Id. (quoting United States v. DRC, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167 (D.D.C. 2012)) (“‘A claim 
may be “legally false” if it represents falsely that the party submitting the claim has complied with an 
applicable federal statute or regulation, or with a contractual term.’”). 
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Legally false claims may be further divided into express false 
certifications and implied false certifications, depending on the type of 
certification made (or not) on the claim or invoice.142  An express false 
certification occurs when a claimant makes an “explicitly false 
certification of compliance with an underlying program condition, such as 
by signing a false certification statement” on a claim or invoice.143  In the 
absence of an explicitly false certification, some courts in certain situations 
imply compliance with federal laws as part of the claimant’s submission 
of a reimbursement claim.144  Stated another way, an implied false 
certification occurs when a claimant submits a reimbursement claim 
without disclosing that the claimant is in violation of a legal requirement 
that affects the claimant’s eligibility for payment.145 
In its 2016 decision in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States 
ex rel. Escobar, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved a circuit 
split regarding the viability of implied false certification claims, holding 
that such claims are permissible under the FCA.146  The Court stated that 
“misrepresentations by omission can give rise to liability,”147 reasoning 
that “half-truths—representations that state the truth only so far as it goes, 
while omitting critical qualifying information can be actionable.”148  The 
Court also held that, “when a defendant submits a claim, it impliedly 
certifies compliance with all conditions of payment.”149  However, the 
Court also inserted a materiality requirement; that is, a “misrepresentation 
                                                          
 142.   See, e.g., Benjamin Dacin, Legal Materiality and the Implied Certification Theory of the 
False Claims Act: Why Courts Have Rejected the Traditional Standards of Materiality in Favor of a 
Precondition to Payment Requirement, 17 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 31, 34 (2012) (distinguishing 
between factually false and legally false claims); Joan H. Krause, Reflections on Certification, 
Interpretation, and the Quest for Fraud that “Counts” under the False Claims Act, 2017 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1811, 1812–13 (2017) (providing guidance regarding the types of misrepresentations that should 
suffice for FCA liability under the implied false certification theory of liability; noting that, while the 
implied false certification theory survived Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. 
Escobar, without more definitive guidance the lower courts will be left to sort out confusing, highly 
fact-specific cases); Joseph R. Berger, Recent Rulings on Implied Certification under the False Claims 
Act: Limitations on a Common-Law Theory, 16 J. HEALTH CARE FRAUD 2, 2–10 (2010) (summarizing 
district and appellate court decisions involving the implied false certification theory of liability under 
the FCA); Scott Oswald et al., Health Care Law Expands False Claims Act Liability under Anti-
Kickback Statute, 26 NO. 3 WESTLAW J. GOV’T CONTRACT 2, 9 (2012) (explaining how the Affordable 
Care Act rendered moot the former reliance on the implied false certification theory of liability in 
order to bring a False Claims Act case based on a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute). 
 143.   Krause, supra note 142, at 1817. 
 144.   Id. 
 145.   Id. 
 146.   136 S. Ct. 1989, 1999 (2016). 
 147.   Id.  
 148.   Id. at 2000. 
 149.   Id. at 1995. 
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about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement 
must be material to the Government’s payment decision in order to be 
actionable . . . .”150  The Court clarified that materiality would not be found 
where “noncompliance is minor or insubstantial.”151  Instead, materiality 
is determined by “‘the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the 
recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.’”152  Compliance with the Anti-
Kickback Statute, discussed in Part I of this Article, has been found to be 
a material condition of payment by the Medicare program.153  Indeed, 
President Obama’s Affordable Care Act amended the Anti-Kickback 
Statute in 2010 to state that, “a claim that includes items or services 
resulting from a violation of [the Anti-Kickback Statute] constitutes a false 
or fraudulent claim for purposes of [the False Claims Act].”154 
All pharmaceutical companies, including opioid manufacturers, must 
certify compliance with a number of statutes and regulations, including 
requirements set forth in the federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
(FDCA) and the FDCA’s implementing regulations.155  Among other 
prohibitions, the FDCA forbids false or misleadingly-labeled products as 
well as products with labels that do not bear “adequate directions for 
use.”156  The FDCA’s implementing regulations clarify that directions are 
inadequate if they are deficient with respect to the “conditions, purposes, 
or uses” for which the drug is intended, the quantity of dose, or the 
frequency of administration.157  The FDCA is also violated when a drug is 
                                                          
 150.   Id. at 1996, 2002 (“What matters is . . . whether the defendant knowingly violated a 
requirement that the defendant knows is material to the Government’s payment decision.  A 
misrepresentation about compliance with a statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement must be 
material to the Government’s payment decision in order to be actionable under the False Claims Act.”).  
 151.   Id. at 2003. 
 152.   Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016) 
(quoting 26 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12 (4th ed. 2003)). 
 153.   U.S. Complaint in Intervention, supra note 71, at 35, ¶ 10–11. 
 154.   42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012).  See also United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone 
Med. Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 395 (1st Cir. 2011) (“If kickbacks affected the transaction underlying a 
claim . . . the claim failed to meet a condition of payment . . . . We find . . . that the kickbacks were 
capable of influencing Medicare’s decision as to whether to pay the hospital and physician claims.”). 
 155.   21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399f (2012 & Supp. 2017) (codifying the FDCA); 21 C.F.R. §§ 201.1–
201.328 (2017) (codifying the FDCA’s implementing regulations). 
 156.   21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (prohibiting the introduction into interstate 
commerce of misbranded drugs); id. § 352(a) (stating that a drug or device is deemed to be misbranded 
if its label is false or misleading); id. § 352(f) (requiring adequate directions for use); 21 C.F.R. § 
201.5 (2017) (defining adequate directions for use; providing reasons directions may be inadequate 
for use). 
 157.   21 C.F.R. § 201.5 (2017) (“Adequate directions for use means directions under which the 
layman can use a drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended.  Directions for use may be 
inadequate because, among other reasons, of omission, in whole or in part, or incorrect specification 
of . . . [s]tatements of all conditions, purposes, or uses for which such drug is intended, including 
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marketed “off label”; that is, for a use or at a dosage other than those 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).158 
In addition, pharmaceutical manufacturers must certify compliance 
with regulations governing risk evaluation and mitigation strategies 
(REMS).159  As background, the FDA has authority to require a REMS in 
situations in which the FDA determines that safety measures (beyond 
labeling) are needed to ensure that a drug’s benefits outweigh its risks.160  
REMS include medication guides, communication plans, and lists of 
recommendations and goals to assure the safe use of a drug.161  The FDA 
explains that, “REMS focus on preventing, monitoring and/or managing a 
specific serious risk by informing, educating and/or reinforcing actions to 
reduce the frequency and/or severity of the event.”162 
Under the FCA’s qui tam163 provisions, a private person known as a 
relator (or whistleblower) who has knowledge of past or present fraud 
committed against the federal government is permitted to bring a suit in 
the government’s name and on the government’s behalf.164  If the 
government proceeds with the action brought by the private person, the 
private person can receive “at least fifteen percent but not more than 
twenty-five percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim, 
depending upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed 
to the prosecution of the action, as well as reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, 
and expenses.”165  “If the government does not proceed with [the action], 
the [private] person shall receive an amount . . . . not less than 25 percent 
                                                          
conditions, purposes, or uses for which it is prescribed, recommended, or suggested in its oral, written, 
printed, or graphic advertising, and conditions, purposes, or uses for which the drug is commonly 
used . . . .”); id. (including omissions or incorrect specifications relating to “[q]uantity of dose” and 
“[f]requency of administration or application” within the concept of inadequate directions for use). 
 158.   See United States v. Caronia, 576 F. Supp. 2d 385, 389 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (defining “off-
label” uses as those that are “non-FDA approved”). 
 159.   21 U.S.C. § 355-1(e) (2012 & Supp. 2017) (providing regulations governing REMS, 
including their content, communication plan). 
 160.   The Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act, Pub. L. No. 110–85, § 901, 121 Stat. 
823 (2007). 
 161.   U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) (last updated 
Feb. 2, 2018) https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/REMS/default.htm [https://perma.cc/ZXG5-
V7Q7]. 
 162.   Id. 
 163.   The term qui tam is derived from the Latin phrase “qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se 
ipso in hac parte sequitur,” meaning “he who sues in this matter for the king as well as for himself.”  
See Pamela H. Bucy, Federalism and False Claims, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599, 1600 (2007) 
(translating and discussing the term); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English 
Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 550 (2000) (same). 
 164.   31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012) (allowing a private person to bring a civil action for violations 
of 31 U.S.C. § 3729). 
 165.   Id. § 3730(d)(1). 
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and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement, 
plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”166 
A wide range of business competitors, disgruntled former employees, 
over-billed patients, and other individuals have brought qui tam actions 
under the FCA against pharmaceutical companies and other health 
industry participants.167  Unless the action is brought by the Attorney 
General or the person bringing the action is the original source of the 
information, a court has the authority to dismiss a qui tam action if 
“substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action 
or claim were [already] publicly disclosed”: (1) in a “hearing in which the 
Government or its agent is a party;” (2) in a “federal report, hearing, audit, 
or investigation;” or (3) “from the news media.”168 
Using the FCA’s qui tam provisions, relators have successfully 
alleged that drug manufacturers have violated the FDA’s off-label 
marketing prohibitions and REMS provisions in a number of non-opioid 
cases, resulting in substantial settlements.  In July 2017, for example, the 
DOJ announced that New Jersey-based Celgene Corporation had agreed 
to pay $280 million to settle fraud charges involving the company’s illegal 
promotion of two cancer drugs for uses not approved by the FDA.169  The 
settlement resolved allegations that Celgene promoted its cancer drugs 
Thalomid and Revlimid “for uses that were not approved by the FDA and 
not covered by federal health care programs.”170  “The allegations included 
the use of false and misleading statements about the [two cancer] drugs,” 
as well as the payment of remuneration “to physicians to induce them to 
prescribe the two drugs.”171  In the press release announcing the settlement, 
Acting United States Attorney Sandra R. Brown stated, “Patients deserve 
to know their doctors are prescribing drugs that are likely to provide 
effective treatment, rather than drugs marketed aggressively by 
pharmaceutical companies.”172 
A few months later, in September 2017, the DOJ announced that 
                                                          
 166.   Id. § 3730(d)(2).  
 167.   See Krause, supra note 142, at 1816. 
 168.   31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2012) (barring certain qui tam actions, including those in which the 
allegations or transactions have already been publicly disclosed). 
 169.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Cent. Dist. of Cal., Celgene 
Agrees to Pay $280 Million to Resolve Fraud Allegations Related to Promotion of Cancer Drugs for 
Uses Not Approved by FDA (July 24, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/celgene-agrees-
pay-280-million-resolve-fraud-allegations-related-promotion-cancer-drugs [https://perma.cc/LZ6A-
CJ7L]. 
 170.   Id. 
 171.   Id. 
 172.   Id. 
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Aegerion Pharmaceuticals agreed to pay $35 million to the federal 
government to resolve allegations that it violated the FCA by causing false 
claims to be submitted to Medicare and Medicaid with respect to its 
prescription drug Juxtapid.173  The allegations in the FCA portion of the 
settlement, totaling $28.8 million, related to Aegerion’s promotion of 
Juxtapid for patients without a diagnosis of, or consistent with, 
homozygous familial hypercholesterolemia (HoFH), which is a rare, 
inherited disorder that prevents the removal of LDL-C (known as “bad 
cholesterol”) from the blood, causing abnormally high levels of circulating 
LDL-C.174  The allegations in the FCA portion of the settlement also 
related to Aegerion’s: (1) false and misleading statements to physicians 
that Juxtapid was appropriate for use in patients with high cholesterol 
generally, not just patients with HoFH; and (2) “alteration or falsification 
of statements of medical necessity and prior authorizations that were 
submitted to federal health care programs.”175 
Aegerion also pled guilty, agreeing to pay a criminal fine and 
forfeiture of $7.2 million, as a result of its violations of the FDA’s REMS 
provisions.176  As background, the FDA required a REMS as part of 
Juxtapid’s approval.177  “The specific purpose of the Juxtapid REMS was 
to educate prescribers about the risks of liver toxicity and to restrict access 
to Juxtapid only to those patients with a clinical or laboratory diagnosis 
consistent with HoFH.”178  Aegerion allegedly filed a misleading REMS 
assessment report and, later, failed to comply with REMS requirements, 
such as distributing Juxtapid only for the treatment of HoFH (not high 
cholesterol generally) without adequate directions for such use.179  
Aegerion’s settlement resolves a qui tam action initially filed by Michele 
Clarke, Tricia Mullins, and Kristi Winger Szudlo, former Aegerion 
employees, who received $4.7 million for their qui tam work.180  Both the 
Celegene and Aegerion settlements show that compliance with the FDCA 
and its implementing regulations, including its “off label” marketing 
                                                          
 173.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Drug Maker Aegerion Agrees 
to Plead Guilty; Will Pay More Than $35 Million to Resolve Criminal Charges and Civil False Claims 
Allegations (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/drug-maker-aegerion-agrees-plead-
guilty-will-pay-more-35-million-resolve-criminal-charges-and [https://perma.cc/LMV3-NNEG]. 
 174.   Id. 
 175.   Id. 
 176.   Id. 
 177.   Id. 
 178.   Id. 
 179.   Id. 
 180.   See Complaint, United States et al. v. Aegerion Pharm., Inc., et al., No. 13-cv-11785 (D. 
Mass. July 26, 2013). 
928 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
prohibitions and its REMS requirements, can result in violations of the 
FCA.181 
B. Application to the Opioid Context 
1. Cases Involving Factually False Claims 
Although the legally false certification theory of FCA liability has 
received significant attention in part due to the Supreme Court’s 2016 
opinion in United States ex rel. Escobar, health industry participants that 
prescribe or dispense opioids have the potential to violate more traditional 
(and academically more straightforward) provisions within the FCA, 
including those that prohibit factually false claims.  For example, the DOJ 
announced in June 2017 that “Rhine Drug Company and Andrew ‘Carter’ 
Clements, Jr. agreed to pay a total of $2.175 million to resolve allegations 
that they violated the [FCA].”182  In particular, the Government alleged 
that Rhine Drug Company and Clements violated the FCA by submitting 
claims to Medicare for drugs that Rhine Drug Company had actually not 
dispensed to patients.183 
The press release announcing the settlement quoted Acting United 
States Attorney James Durham as stating, “‘Pharmacists are supposed to 
bill only for what they dispense and they’re to keep accurate records of the 
prescription drugs they let walk out of their pharmacies.’”184  The press 
release also quoted Derrick L. Jackson, Special Agent in Charge of the 
federal Department of Health and Human Services-Office of Inspector 
General (HHS-OIG) Office in Atlanta, as stating, “Billing Medicare for 
prescription drugs that were never dispensed to patients is a serious 
allegation.”185  The only good news about the factually false claims made 
in the Rhine Drug Company case is that they do not contribute to the 
patient injury (i.e., addiction) side of the opioid crisis.  That is, the 
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factually false bills certainly increased costs to federal health care 
programs; however, no live patients received any opioids as a result of the 
illegal conduct.186 
In a second example of a case involving factually false claims, the 
DOJ announced in January 2018 that Matthew Anderson, a chiropractor 
who worked in Lenior City, Tennessee, agreed to pay $1.45 million plus 
interest to resolve FCA violations for his part in contributing to the 
Tennessee opioid crisis.187  As background, Anderson and his management 
company managed four pain clinics in Tennessee, including “Cookeville 
Center for Pain Management, Spinal Pain Solutions in Harriman, 
Preferred Pain Center of Grundy County, and McMinnville Pain Relief 
Center.”188  The Government alleged that Anderson and his management 
company, among other illegal conduct, instructed employees at all four 
clinics to up-code office visits by assigning an inaccurate billing code to 
increase Medicare reimbursement.189  The press release announcing the 
settlement quoted Derrick L. Jackson, Special Agent in Charge of the 
HHS-OIG office in Atlanta, as stating, “The opioid epidemic has had a 
crushing effect on patients and families across middle Tennessee . . . Pill 
mills like these billed medically unnecessary services to Medicare and 
TennCare and contributed to problems of opioid abuse and addiction.”190 
In a third example of a case involving factually false claims, the qui 
tam relators (and now the Government in intervention) in the consolidated 
cases against Insys allege that Insys’s Internal Reimbursement Center 
(IRC) prepared false documentation that would accompany claims to 
federal health care programs.  In particular, the qui tam relators allege that 
the IRC, which assisted prescribers with completing Subsys prior 
authorization forms, would include in those prior authorization forms 
cancer diagnoses when the patients to whom the forms related did not have 
cancer or had a distant cancer diagnosis unrelated to their current pain.191  
In addition, the qui tam relators allege that, in cases in which a prescriber 
had included the patient’s true (but non-reimbursable) diagnosis on a 
Subsys prior authorization form (e.g., chronic pain or back pain), Insys 
would later change that diagnosis to a false (but reimbursable) diagnosis 
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(e.g., cancer).192 
Unlike prescribers and dispensers, pharmaceutical manufacturers do 
not actually submit claims to federal health care programs.  However, 
pharmaceutical manufacturers can “cause” a false claim to be submitted 
(or “cause” a false, material prior authorization form to be submitted) in 
cases in which the manufacturer changes a patient’s diagnosis from a non-
reimbursable diagnosis to a reimbursable diagnosis on a prior 
authorization form that is submitted to a payor.  These types of false 
statements, or records, are illegal under the FCA because the FCA creates 
liability not just for those who submit false claims but also for those who 
“cause” false reimbursement claims to be made or “cause” false statements 
to be made in connection with claims for reimbursement.193 
2. Cases Involving Legally False Claims 
In addition to cases involving factually false claims, several health 
industry participants have settled FCA allegations predicated on violations 
of material statutes and regulations including, but not limited to, 
provisions within the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).  These cases are 
known as legally false claims cases.  For example, PharMerica 
Corporation agreed to pay the Government $31.5 million in May 2015 “to 
resolve a lawsuit alleging that PharMerica violated the CSA by dispensing 
Schedule II controlled drugs without a valid prescription” and the FCA by 
submitting false claims to Medicare for improperly dispensed drugs.194  As 
background, “PharMerica is a long-term care pharmacy that dispenses 
medications to residents of long-term care facilities, including nursing 
homes and skilled nursing facilities.”195  Many of the prescriptions filled 
by PharMerica, including oxycodone and fentanyl, were for controlled 
substances listed in Schedule II under the CSA.196  In terms of the CSA 
allegations, the Government alleged that PharMerica pharmacies located 
across the nation frequently dispensed oxycodone, fentanyl, and other 
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Schedule II controlled drugs without a CSA-required physician 
prescription.197  Instead, nursing home staff would order opioids and other 
controlled drugs for residents and PharMerica pharmacists would dispense 
the staff-ordered drugs without a physician’s prescription.198  PharMerica 
agreed to pay $8 million to resolve the Government’s CSA allegations.199 
In terms of the FCA allegations, the Government alleged that 
PharMerica knowingly submitted false claims to Medicare Part D—the 
part of Medicare that provides a prescription drug benefit—for the same 
improperly dispensed Schedule II drugs.200  PharMerica agreed to pay 
$23.5 million to resolve the Government’s FCA allegations.201  The FCA 
allegations were initially raised by relator Jennifer Denk, a pharmacist 
formerly employed by PharMerica, under the FCA’s qui tam provisions.202  
Ms. Denk received $4.3 million for her qui tam work on the case.203 
The consolidated qui tam actions against Insys contain numerous other 
legally false claims allegations.  For example, the qui tam relators (and 
now the Government in intervention) allege that Insys violated the FCA 
by violating the Anti-Kickback Statute by offering or paying remuneration 
to prescribers in return for writing Subsys prescriptions.204  As discussed 
in Part I, President Obama’s Affordable Care Act amended the Anti-
Kickback Statute in 2010 to state that, “a claim that includes items or 
services resulting from a violation of [the Anti-Kickback Statute] 
constitutes a false or fraudulent claim for purposes of [the False Claims 
Act].”205  By further example, the qui tam relators (and now the 
Government in intervention) allege that Insys violated the FCA by 
marketing and promoting Subsys for off-label uses.206  In particular, the 
plaintiffs argue that Insys’ promotional activities influenced prescribers to 
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prescribe Subsys for non-cancer-pain uses not covered by federal health 
care programs, which “caused” the claims ultimately submitted by those 
prescribers to be false in violation of the FCA.207 
3. Qui Tam Actions Barred in Cases Involving Prior Public Disclosure 
Remember that, unless a qui tam action is brought by the Attorney 
General or the person bringing the action is an original source of 
information, a court has the authority under the FCA to dismiss a qui tam 
action if “substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in 
the action or claim” have already been publicly disclosed by the news 
media, through a hearing in which the Government is a party, or in a 
federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation.208  These dismissal 
provisions may soon be applied to a qui tam opioid case.  In United States 
ex rel Manchester v. Purdue Pharma et al., relator Robert Manchester 
filed a qui tam action against a number of defendants, including Purdue 
Pharma, McKesson Corporation, Cardinal Health, and 
AmerisourceBergen Corporation.209  In his complaint, Manchester alleged 
that Purdue failed to tell the FDA about an abuse-deterrent formulation of 
OxyContin.210  On August 22, 2018, the United States filed a motion 
arguing that the case should be dismissed, reasoning that Manchester 
based his allegations against the defendants “only on publicly available 
information.”211  In its motion, the United States specified that both news 
media and federal reports raised the issue of alleged marketing to 
overprescribing physicians before Manchester filed his action, making 
Manchester’s case worthy of dismissal under the terms of the FCA.212 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND NEW INITIATIVES 
This Article has identified and discussed several opioid cases that 
involve the federal Anti-Kickback Statute and the federal civil False 
Claims Act.  What effect have these two statutes had on the opioid crisis 
as a whole?  Starting with the Anti-Kickback Statute, the federal 
Government clearly is using this legal tool in an attempt to cut off opioid 
over-prescribing and/or testing over-referring induced by remuneration.  
The prescribing physicians, nurse practitioners, and physician assistants 
discussed in Part I of this Article had been receiving millions of dollars of 
remuneration in return for their frequent opioid prescriptions, referrals of 
patients for drug testing services, and referrals of patients for opioid 
addiction treatment services.  Remember Dr. Johnson, who had entered 
into a joint venture with William Hughes, the owner of Universal Oral 
Fluids Lab (UOFL), pursuant to which Dr. Johnson referred all of his 
patients, including his Medicare and Medicaid patients, to UOFL for drug 
testing and related services?213  In that case, UOFL received approximately 
$3,443,528 from Medicare and $1,147,768 from Pennsylvania Medicaid 
based on Dr. Johnson’s referrals alone.214  In addition, Dr. Johnson 
received more than $2,300,000 in kickbacks from UOFL between May 
2011 and November 2013.215  And, this is just one opioid case involving 
one referring physician and one referred-to entity.  From this perspective, 
the Anti-Kickback Statute can be seen as an effective tool for combating 
opioid-related health care fraud, abuse, and waste and for protecting 
patients in cases in which a prescriber’s medical judgment has been 
compromised by illegal remuneration. 
That said, note how many of these cases discussed in Part I of this 
Article involved the opioid Subsys, manufactured by Insys.  In terms of 
the prescription portion of the opioid crisis, which is just one portion of 
the overall opioid crisis,216 Subsys is an exceptionally “small [opioid] 
fish.”217  In particular, fewer than 0.02% of the 52 million opioid patients 
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were prescribed Subsys in the year 2015, which many view as the peak of 
opioid prescribing in the United States.218  Stepping back even further, 
Insys is not even among the top fifty pharmaceutical companies in terms 
of payments to opioid prescribers, and most of Insys’s top payees are, to 
this day, still practicing medicine or nursing and are still serving as 
physician assistants.219  Although Insys certainly ranks high in terms of its 
aggressive opioid marketing practices and its bold remuneration schemes, 
which explains why they are an easy governmental target, the 
Government’s take-down of key Insys payors and top Subsys prescribers 
is relatively insignificant when viewed from the perspective of the entire 
opioid manufacturing industry. 
The Anti-Kickback Statute thus may be viewed as an effective tool for 
purposes of dealing with individual bad actors, like Drs. Couch and Ruan, 
whose opioid prescriptions were fueled by remuneration and greed.  
However, the Anti-Kickback Statute is also a relatively small tool in terms 
of combating the overall opioid crisis.  Remember that although the opioid 
crisis is frequently framed as a prescription drug epidemic primarily 
attributable to the over-prescription of opioids, illicit (non-prescription) 
drugs also play a very large role in the crisis220 and opioid prescribing has 
been on the decline since 2016.221  Also remember that Congress enacted 
the Anti-Kickback Statute based on the concern that health care kickbacks 
can lead to corruption of medical decision making; patient steering; 
overutilization of health care items, services, and supplies; increased costs 
to federal health care programs; and unfair competition.222  The Anti-
Kickback Statute was simply not designed to address, and does not 
address, the many other behavioral, sociocultural, socioeconomic, and 
criminal justice factors that are believed to contribute to the opioid 
crisis.223 
For example, in terms of behavioral factors that contribute to the 
opioid crisis, some physicians overprescribe opioids even though they do 
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not receive remuneration for those prescriptions.  That is, some physicians 
simply overprescribe—either because they were taught to prescribe in that 
manner or because they developed their own over-prescribing 
behaviors.224  By further example, in terms of sociocultural and 
socioeconomic factors that contribute to the opioid crisis, one line of 
research views opioid addiction as a symptom of an economic and social 
despair that is both: (1) markedly higher among those without a college 
degree; and (2) one result of a long process that has eroded working-class 
life in the United States and that has led to an increase in pain-related 
complaints.225  A second line of research shows that the criminal justice 
system is ill-equipped to address the opioid crisis, and that criminalization 
of illicit drug use has the unintended effect of increasing stigma and 
decreasing access to treatments by individuals with opioid use disorder.226  
In summary, the opioid crisis has multiple contributing factors, most of 
which cannot be addressed by the Anti-Kickback Statute. 
In terms of the behavior that the Anti-Kickback Statute (and the False 
Claims Act) are designed to address, it must be noted that these statutes 
are limited in their application to federal (versus private) health care 
program business.  The Anti-Kickback Statute thus does not apply to a 
patient recruiter who offers or pays remuneration in return for private 
health insurance business, or a prescriber who solicits or receives 
remuneration in return for writing opioid prescriptions or referring patients 
for drug testing or addiction treatment services that are reimbursed by 
private health insurance.  The same is true of a prescriber who submits a 
false claim to a private insurer or who makes a false statement that is 
material to a claim submitted to a private insurer.  That said, other federal 
laws,227 including the new Eliminating Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 
2018,228 as well as many state laws229 do apply in the context of private 
health insurance. 
What about the effectiveness of the False Claims Act in terms of 
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combating the opioid crisis? As discussed in Part II of this Article, some 
factually false claims, including claims for services never provided, 
certainly can increase unnecessary costs to federal health care programs.  
However, these factually false claims do not contribute to the patient 
injury (or addiction) side of the opioid crisis because opioids were never 
dispensed to any live patients.  Other factually false statements, including 
diagnoses that are falsified to ensure reimbursement, can contribute to the 
patient injury side of the opioid crisis, however.  For example, when a non-
cancer patient receives an opioid approved by the FDA only for patients 
with cancer-related pain due to a falsified diagnostic statement, the patient 
may be unnecessarily exposed to a highly addictive drug and life-
threatening respiratory depression as a result. 
Because the False Claims Act targets so many different types of 
conduct, including factually false and legally false claims, as well as 
expressly false and impliedly false certifications, the False Claims Act is 
viewed as an important tool in terms of combating the opioid crisis.230  One 
follow-up issue, though, is whether the Government has sufficient 
resources to investigate all of the behavior that potentially violates the 
False Claims Act in the context of opioids.  On one hand, the DOJ 
announced in February 2018 the creation of its Prescription Interdiction & 
Litigation (PIL) Task Force, specifically designed to fight the prescription 
opioid crisis.231  According to the DOJ’s press release on the topic, the PIL 
Task Force will “aggressively deploy and coordinate all available criminal 
and civil law enforcement tools to reverse the tide of opioid overdoses in 
the United States, with a particular focus on opioid manufacturers and 
distributors.”232  The press release specifically announces that the DOJ will 
use the False Claims Act in its fight against the opioid crisis: 
The PIL Task Force will use criminal and civil actions to ensure that 
distributors and pharmacies are obeying [DEA] rules designed to prevent 
diversion and improper prescribing.  It will use the False Claims Act and 
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other tools to crack down on pain-management clinics, drug testing 
facilities, and physicians that make opioid prescriptions.233 
Whether governmental funding is sufficient to support the important 
activities of the PIL Task Force remains to be seen, although recent reports 
suggest that the enforcement of the FCA in opioid cases continues to 
increase.234 
The federal government has other new initiatives relevant to opioid 
fraud and abuse, and the implementation and enforcement of these new 
initiatives remains to be seen as well.  On October 24, 2018, President 
Trump signed into law the SUPPORT for Patients and Communities Act 
(SUPPORT Act), a comprehensive piece of legislation designed to combat 
the opioid crisis.235  The SUPPORT Act appropriates millions of dollars 
from the Treasury and the federal Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust 
Fund to support a variety of federal agencies in the creation and/or 
execution of new research studies, reports, demonstration projects, 
programs, guidelines, and enforcement efforts designed to combat the 
opioid crisis.236  One part of the SUPPORT Act establishes the Eliminating 
Kickbacks in Recovery Act of 2018 (EKRA).237  EKRA builds on the 
prohibitions set forth in the federal Anti-Kickback Statute by making 
illegal the knowing and willful solicitation or receipt, or offer or payment, 
of remuneration, directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in 
kind, in return for the referral of a patient or patronage to a recovery home, 
clinical treatment facility, or laboratory or to induce a referral of an 
individual to a recovery home, clinical treatment facility, or laboratory.238  
EKRA defines recovery home as a shared living environment that is, or 
purports to be, free from alcohol and illicit drug use and centered on peer 
support and connection to services that promotes sustained recovery from 
substance use disorders.239  EKRA further defines clinical treatment 
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facility as a medical setting, other than a hospital, that provides 
detoxification, risk reduction, outpatient treatment and care, residential 
treatment, or rehabilitation for substance use, pursuant to licensure or 
certification under State law.240 
Although some behaviors prohibited by EKRA are technically already 
prohibited by the federal Anti-Kickback Statute, EKRA applies to 
remuneration exchanged for both public and private health care program 
business.241  As such, EKRA builds on the federal Anti-Kickback Statute 
by prohibiting the exchange of remuneration for referrals for private-
health-insurance-reimbursed recovery home services, clinical treatment 
services, and laboratory services.  (EKRA, like the Anti-Kickback Statute, 
would not apply to the referral of these services when paid for by cash or 
credit card.)  In a recent press release, the DOJ explained why EKRA was 
needed: “[P]atients in substance abuse treatment facilities are not usually 
typical Medicare beneficiaries, but are often people on private insurance 
or even people in their early [twenties] still on their parents’ insurance.  
‘These patients are really treated as cash registers . . . .’”242  EKRA 
establishes criminal penalties of not more than $200,000, imprisonment of 
not more than ten years, or both, for each violation of EKRA.243  EKRA 
further provides that it does not supersede or preempt other applicable 
federal or state laws, including the federal Anti-Kickback Statute.244 
In addition to the PIL Task Force and EKRA, the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) also recently created a mega anti-fraud 
program, called the Unified Program Integrity Contractor (UPIC), in an 
attempt to improve health care fraud and abuse economies of scale and 
address state-specific fraud and abuse issues.245  In particular, UPIC will 
be responsible for health care fraud and abuse data mining, investigations, 
law enforcement referrals, claims auditing, provider education, and other 
fraud and abuse prevention activities.246  CMS designed UPIC with the 
goal of bridging and improving health care fraud and abuse 
communications between and among the federal Medicare Program and 
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state Medicaid Programs.247  According to CMS, UPIC will be capable of 
detecting health care providers who, for example, commit Medicare fraud 
and abuse and then relocate to a new state and attempt to repeat the 
fraudulent activity in connection with the new state’s Medicaid 
Program.248 
Between the new PIL Task Force, EKRA, and UPIC, the federal 
government’s health care fraud and abuse detection, investigation, and 
enforcement efforts appear to be at an all-time high.  Hopefully, these new 
initiatives will assist in the detection and prevention of opioid fraud and 
abuse as well. 
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